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Non-Technical Summary 
Every year approximately 2,000 farms in Ireland violate the EU Nitrates Regulations. Although small 
when expressed as a proportion of more than 130,000 Irish farms, the rate of noncompliance has 
remained fairly constant in recent years, with knock-on effects for water quality. In this paper, we 
present the results of a large-scale statistical analysis of the characteristics of farms and farmers that 
exceed the basic regulatory limit of 170 Kg of nitrogen per hectare (NPH). (The analysis excludes 
farms that successfully apply for a derogation that increases this limit to 250 Kg NPH, provided they 
meet additional conditions). 
We were granted access to relevant administrative datasets held by the Department of Agriculture, 
Food and the Marine (DAFM) for the period 2006-2015. These were cleaned and combined into a 
master dataset containing more than 1,250,000 individual records. The construction of such a large 
dataset allowed the application of sensitive statistical techniques, which were used to relate the 
characteristics of farms and farmers to the likelihood of noncompliance with the regulations.  
The primary purpose of the analysis was to build models that are able to predict which farms are 
most at risk of noncompliance. On an ongoing basis such models can be updated with the latest data 
and used to identify farms that are most likely to violate the regulations, with a view to targeting 
interventions accordingly. A secondary aim of this research was to give insights into the types of 
farms and farmers most likely not to comply. Although the data did not contain information about 
individual farmers’ behaviours and attitudes, the associations uncovered by the models nevertheless 
permit some insights. Statistical models were applied both to the data for individual years and to the 
data for all the years combined. The results from both types of models were similar.     
We found that the higher the level of NPH in previous years, the higher the risk of noncompliance. 
While at one level this is not surprising, the steady increase in the likelihood of noncompliance 
(rather than a threshold level above which farms are at substantially greater risk) implies that many 
violations are not due to small changes in behaviour, but instead reflect substantial changes to 
business practice from year to year. Farms with smaller land holdings are also more likely to violate 
the regulations. This may be because small farms face lower penalties, on average, and require less 
substantial changes in stocking rates to break regulatory limits. Interestingly, older farmers are less 
likely to be in breach. Combined with the other findings, this is consistent with the possibility that 
regulatory violations are most likely when a farm business undergoes change, perhaps because of a 
new business model, expanded production, or the transaction of land. Noncompliance was also 
variable across different counties. A detailed pattern emerged from the models, which is mapped in 
the main body of the paper and the Annex.  
We compared the predictive performance of the statistical models against a rule-of-thumb used by 
DAFM, which is to target farms above 150 Kg NPH. The models are able to identify those farms that 
have a higher probability of noncompliance more accurately than this rule. By updating the models 
to make use of the most recently available data, it should be possible to exploit them in coming 
years to identify those farms that are at greatest risk of noncompliance and to target and test 
interventions accordingly.    
1. Introduction 
Regulatory measures form an important component of the policy toolkit used to protect and 
enhance the environment. Along with publicly-provided information, provision of public goods and 
economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies, regulatory restrictions can help correct market 
failures and improve societal welfare. While policymakers give considerable attention to the design, 
targeting and stringency of regulations, effective implementation and enforcement is vital too. 
Ideally, regulators should try to maximise compliance with regulations while economising on the 
administrative and policy cost. This process can benefit from better understanding of the 
behavioural responses of those being regulated.  
 
The present paper demonstrates how statistical analysis of administrative data can be used to learn 
more about compliance behaviour, in this case the behaviour of farmers. We use data from Ireland’s 
DAFM, Food and the Marine (hereafter DAFM). Our focus is on identifying the characteristics of 
farmers or their farms that can help to predict noncompliance with regulations intended to limit 
emissions of nitrates. Knowing more about these characteristics can help regulators to target 
programmes designed to increase compliance, thereby assisting efforts to protect the natural 
environment and encouraging a minority of farmers to avoid unnecessary penalties. A further 
objective is to identify farms most at risk of noncompliance in order to inform the selection of 
suitable sample groups for trials of behavioural interventions designed to increase compliance (see 
Lunn, 2018, forthcoming).  
 
We hypothesise, and find, that noncompliance is more likely among smaller farms and those farms 
that were closer to breaking the regulations the previous year. Additionally, violation is more likely 
among farms that exceeded regulatory limits in the past, highlighting the presence of repeat 
offenders despite penalties. Noncompliance is also much more likely among younger farmers than 
older farmers. Lastly, we show that the statistical models behind these results predict violations 
more accurately than a standard rule-of-thumb employed by DAFM, which flags farms with nitrates 
levels for the previous year above a threshold of 150 Kg per hectare.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides necessary background 
information on the Nitrates Regulations as well as considering previous relevant literature on 
agricultural regulatory compliance. Section 3 describes the data used, while the methods used to 
answer our research questions are discussed in Section 4. Results are presented in Section 5, before 
a conclusion and discussion of potential future research is given in Section 6.  
 
2. Background and previous research 
This section outlines the regulatory background and discusses some previous research into farmers’ 
compliance with environmental regulations. 
 
2.1 Nitrates regulation in Ireland 
The European Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC) – Council Directive of 12 December 1991 concerning 
the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources – was adopted 
in 1991. It has the objective of limiting nitrate concentration in ground and surface water. 
Ondersteijn et al. (2002) detail many negative consequences caused by nutrient pollution from 
agriculture including eutrophication of surface and marine waters which can lead to explosive algae 
growth, as well as potential health hazards from nitrogen exposure, such as ‘blue-baby syndrome’ 
and stomach cancer. 
 
Compliance with the Nitrates Regulations is one of the Statutory Management Requirements under 
the Single Payment Scheme, introduced in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms of 2003 
which attempted to harmonise agriculture regulations across EU Member States.1 The reforms made 
clear that each payment of the CAP would be conditional on a farm’s cross compliance of a variety of 
agricultural regulations. Failure to comply with the regulations puts a farm’s Single Payment at risk 
with penalty deductions in operation.  
 
Ireland’s first Nitrates Action Programme (NAP) under the Nitrates Directive came into operation in 
2006. The current regulations in Ireland are set out in the European Communities (Good Agricultural 
Practice for Protection of Waters) Regulations, 2014, which we describe as the ‘Nitrates 
Regulations’.2 Under the Nitrates Regulations, farmers are obliged to ensure that the total amount 
of Nitrogen (N) from livestock manure does not exceed 170 Kg of N per hectare per year (hereafter 
NPH). This limit is equivalent to two dairy cows per hectare. The NPH figure for each farm in a given 
year is arrived at by dividing the figure for the total kilograms of nitrogen produced on the farm, 
obtained from the Animal Identification and Movement (AIM) System, by the farm’s eligible area 
under the Basic Payment Scheme.3  
 
If a farm is deemed to have violated the regulation in a particular year, it receives a statement early 
in the next following year.4 Appeals can be made and farmers can submit further documentation 
explaining the reasons for their breach, but if the farm is still deemed to be over the limit following 
any appeal, a penalty letter is issued. Penalties are higher for repeated breaches within three 
calendar years. On a first repetition, the initial sanction is multiplied by a factor of three. For further 
reoccurrences, the previous percentage sanction is multiplied by three, up to a maximum sanction of 
15%. Repeated breaches after this can lead to higher sanctions up to the loss of an entire year’s 
Single Farm Payment under the Basic Payment Scheme. The national average value for a Single Farm 
Payment was around €9,414 in 2018.5 
 
Farmers can apply for a “Nitrates Derogation” which allows them to apply greater amounts of 
livestock manure per year, up to a maximum of 250 Kg of NPH subject to some additional conditions 
being met.6 Eligible grassland farmers have to make an annual application to avail of this derogation. 
DAFM provides annual nitrogen and phosphorus statements online as a service to all farmers 
registered.7 Interim nitrogen and phosphorus statements have also recently become available, 
                                                          
1 There is variation in how the Nitrates Directive operates in each of the member states. 
2 Ireland’s 4th Nitrates Action Programme was introduced in early 2018, effective for 2018-2021. However, this 
paper considers the time period before the 4th NAP. 
3 This information has been taken from a leaflet informing farmers how to avoid breaching the regulation. 
https://www.agriculture.gov.ie/media/migration/ruralenvironment/environment/nitrates/InfoLeafletNitrates2209
15.pdf 
4 At that stage, submission of export forms or rental agreements cannot be accepted as the deadline for submission 
would have been the 31st December of the year in question. 
5 Author’s calculation from data taken from DAFM in February 2018 
https://www.agriculture.gov.ie/schemepaymentsupdate/  
6 For example, farms that have more than 70% of their total land in use as grassland. 
7 This can be accessed at www.agfood.ie. It is a record of annual N and P produced by cattle only, so any other 
livestock N and P figures have to be calculated and added on by the farmers themselves. 
covering the periods January to August. These statements can be of benefit to farmers, especially if 
stock numbers have increased in the past year. They are designed to assist in deciding whether or 
not to take any action before the end of the year to stay within the 170/250 Kg NPH limit. 
 
2.2 Previous research 
As far as we know, this is the first paper to use farm-level administrative data to investigate the 
relationship between farm characteristics and noncompliance with a specific agricultural regulation. 
This is made possible by the availability of data that is sometimes not retained by regulators or is 
heavily restricted in its use for research purposes. Lippert et al. (2014) is the closest research to our 
own. They model noncompliance with organic standards drawing on the economics of crime 
approach (Becker, 1974) to develop and test several hypotheses regarding the likelihood that a 
farmer fails to comply with organic standards. We make use of the results of this study to guide our 
own hypotheses and tests (see below). Jongeneel et al. (2007) estimate the degree and cost of 
compliance with a set of Statutory Management Requirements (SMRs) associated with CAP in a 
number of European countries. They find that the degree of compliance is generally high across the 
SMRs with two exceptions – the Nitrates Directive and the Identification and Registration 
requirements, where there have been rates of noncompliance up to 30% for both. The authors 
attribute the noncompliance rates for the Nitrates Directive to delays in the adjustment of national 
legislation to meet stricter EU standards, rather than to compliance with and enforcement of 
national legislation. EU standards add stringency to regulation at the farm level and provide less 
leeway on compliance. The costs of noncompliance with the Nitrates Directive can be as high as 
several thousand Euros for some offending farms. Specific to the Nitrates Regulations, Kuik (2006) 
reviews a number of ex-ante studies that estimate the costs to farmers of the implementation of the 
Nitrates Directive. He finds a range of costs per hectare from €6 to €236 across different member 
states and different sectors. However, this paper only looks at the costs and benefits to the producer 
(i.e. the farmer), overlooking the wider impacts of such regulation.  
 
Herzfeld & Jongeneel (2008) review the economic theories of compliance with respect to agriculture 
and argue for revising models of compliance to incorporate findings from the psychological and 
behavioural literature, departing from the traditional view of compliance as the outcome of a cost-
benefit decision. For example, it can be argued that peer group effects and institutional quality are 
useful tools for understanding compliance behaviour. The authors suggest that further empirical 
analysis is needed to discover appropriate variables to include when investigating compliance. Our 
paper seeks to do this. 
 
Attitudes towards regulations and the trust in regulatory institutions can influence compliance 
behaviour. Buckley (2012) investigates Irish farmer opinions towards the Nitrates Directive 
Regulations and NAP. He finds four main groupings of opinions based on farmers in the Catchments 
Area Programme in Ireland. Two, identified as “Constrained Practitioners and “Concerned 
Productionists”, view the regulations as interference in farm management and are generally 
sceptical regarding environmental benefits. Two other groups, “Concerned Practitioners” and 
“Benefit Accepters” react favourably towards the regulations and show an appreciation of the 
benefits of improved water quality. The identification of the last two groups of farmers was novel 
and possibly hints at progress in farmers’ attitudes towards nutrient management. However, Irish 
farmers across all groups apart from the “Concerned Practitioners” in the Buckley (2012) study are 
averse to a nitrates cross compliance inspection.8  
 
                                                          
8 Young (2010a) noted that just over one fifth of farmers in Ireland who received an on-farm inspection in 2009 
were found to have some level of noncompliance. 
Using a choice experiment, Buckley et al. (2012) found little willingness of Irish farmers to install 
riparian buffer zones on their farms. In a hypothetical choice offering monetary compensation, over 
half of the farmers surveyed in the Catchment Areas Programme nevertheless indicated a negative 
preference towards buffer zones due to loss of land and nuisance concerns. Furthermore, Buckley et 
al. (2016) report that since NAP came into force in Ireland in 2006, mean nitrogen balances have 
fallen by 25.1 Kg NPH and nitrogen use efficiencies have improved.  
 
In summary, previous literature reveals that noncompliance with the Nitrates Directive is a 
significant problem across the EU, including in Ireland. Most studies reviewed above have 
considered general reasons for noncompliance such as attitudes to regulators, some recording 
substantial scepticism towards environmental benefits, albeit that attitudes may be changing.  
Lippert et al. (2014) is useful for selecting farm characteristics that may be associated with 
noncompliance of an agricultural regulation, which helps to inform our statistical models in Section 
2.2.  
 
3.  Data  
We use ten years of administrative data provided by the Nitrates Section of DAFM, encompassing 
the period 2006-2015. The Department collects a rich farm-level data in relation to livestock, land 
holding, and the import and export of fertilisers, among other variables. There is a full 100% 
administrative check on the livestock manure nitrogen limit. All farms are provided with unique 
alphanumeric herd identification numbers as required in the Cattle Identification and Registration 
Directive S.I. No. 276/1999 - European Communities (Identification and Registration of Bovine 
Animals) Regulations, 1999.9 These herd ID numbers enabled the matching of different datasets 
from separate administrative files. We constructed a master, farm-level panel data set with a total of 
1,287,728 observations. The panel is unbalanced, as not all farms are covered by complete data over 
the ten year period. There were around 144,079 farms in operation in Ireland as of 2015. 
 
3.1 Dependent variable: Violation 
Our principal dependent variable indicates violations of the regulatory limits. The variable takes the 
value 1 if a farm exceeded the regulatory limit of 170 Kg NPH in a given year and 0 otherwise. We 
classify exceedance of this regulatory limit as a violation,10 excluding those farms with a valid 
derogation. Table 1 displays the number of farms that breached the regulation each year.  
                                                          
9 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1999/si/276/made/en/print  
10 In practice, DAFM allows for human error in the measurement or calculation of the NPH figure, so a limit of 
171.7 NPH is the exact cut-off point for violations. We use the 171.7 figure in the creation of the dependent 
variable. 
Table 1: Nitrates Regulation Violations by year (excluding farms with derogations) 
     
 Clear Violation Total Percentage in 
violation 
2006 114,233 8,432 122,665 6.87 
2007 117,627 3,113 120,740 2.58 
2008 120,402 1,699 122,101 1.39 
2009 109,859 1,615 111,474 1.45 
2010 120,903 1,419 122,322 1.16 
2011 109,673 1,526 111,199 1.37 
2012 133,399 1,717 135,116 1.27 
2013 131,118 2,307 133,425 1.73 
2014 131,087 2,115 133,202 1.59 
2015 137,729 2,053 139,782 1.47 
   
Total 1,226,030 25,996 1,252,026 2.08 
     
 
 
The number of violations has been fairly consistent, typically around 1,500-2,000. The exception to 
this pattern is the year 2006 which had a much greater number of violations, probably because the 
derogation was not available to farms until 2007. Of particular concern is the upsurge from 2013, 
which brought the number of breaches above 2,000. Because we exclude farms with a valid 
derogation, these figures represent a lower bound of overall noncompliance with the quantitative 
thresholds, since some farms with a derogation still exceed the 250 Kg NPH limit.  
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
The econometric models include a set of independent variables relating to farm or farmer 
characteristics that may help to explain variations in the probability violation. We follow the 
selection of explanatory variables used in Lippert et al. (2014) to guide our expectations on how a 
characteristic is likely to determine noncompliance. Farm characteristic variables include lagged NPH 
values, land size categories and the type of farm ownership structure. There is also a set of variables 
containing farmer characteristics, which includes the age of the farmer, previous violations and 
derogations, and when the farmer first registered with DAFM. We include dummy variables for 
county and year. Our choice of variables and categories within each variable is limited to cases 
where we had sufficient numbers of observations in the sample. Fortunately, the collected output 
data on nitrates and land holdings is largely complete and informative.  
 
However, the available dataset on penalties imposed on farms under the regulations contains some 
gaps in coverage and suffers from some apparent inconsistencies. This means we are not able to use 
some potential explanatory variables we would ideally like to include, such as the size of the 
previous penalty for those that were penalised.  
 Farm Characteristics 
Lagged NPH 
We include a lagged NPH figure from the previous year as an obvious starting point for explaining 
the probability of a violation in the current year. We do not expect (or often see in the data) very 
large changes in livestock on the farm across one year, so last year’s NPH farm figure is likely to be 
strongly related this year’s figure, assuming business as usual. Farms that are closer to the 170 Kg 
NPH limit have less leeway to increase fertiliser use or increase livestock holdings than those farms 
that have had smaller NPH figures in the past. 
 
Land size 
Land size is likely to play a big role in a farm violating the regulation as it is the denominator in the 
final calculation of a farm’s NPH figure. Although there is obviously a positive correlation between 
land holdings and livestock numbers, farms with greater land holdings should, all else equal, be less 
likely to violate. There is also evidence that compliance costs place small firms at a competitive 
disadvantage (e.g. Crain & Hopkins, 2001). It is likely that regulation impinges more on smaller farms, 
assuming that they have more limited time and resources and therefore are less able to spread 
compliance costs across a wide base. Thus, we hypothesise that smaller farms are likely to violate 
the regulations more often. 
 
Farm Ownership Structure 
Slemrod (2007) discusses the potential asymmetric compliance between individuals and businesses, 
based on differential incentives. Individuals bear full responsibility of any penalty that may arise if 
regulations are broken and, hence, may be inclined to be risk-averse. Businesses, by contrast, may 
operate in a more risk-neutral manner. They may also be affected by principal-agent problems, 
whereby the agent responsible for compliance decisions faces different incentives from the business 
owner. These arguments could apply to farm behaviour in Ireland, which has three types of 
structure: an individual, a company, or a joint venture.11 The large majority of Irish farms are held by 
individuals. Of particular interest may be joint ventures, which occur when two separate farms 
decide to join together in a farm partnership and report to DAFM as one entity. We might expect 
farms in joint ventures to fall foul of the regulations more often, as any potential penalty will be 
shared. 
 Farmer Characteristics  
Age 
We do not have a clear directional hypothesis in relation to the age of the farmer. On the one hand, 
older farmers are likely to have more experience in farming techniques and in dealing with national 
and EU regulations. This experience might reasonably be expected to lower the probability of 
violations. On the other hand, older farmers may be less likely to change long-standing farm 
practices. Buckley et al. (2015) examine the adoption of nutrient management practices across 
farmers and find variables like age and off-farm employment negatively affect take up of these best 
practice schemes. Such resistance to change may mean that older farmers are less likely to manage 
nutrients and hence more likely to violate the regulations. We do not possess data on second jobs a 
farmer may undertake at present. 
 
Time of initial registration with DAFM 
The data indicate when a farm first registered with DAFM and was given a herd number. This 
registration date is used as a proxy for the level of contact a farm has had with DAFM. Farmers that 
have built up a relationship with the Department may be more aware of regulatory requirements 
and informal advice that could assist them in complying with Nitrates Regulations. As this 
requirement was only brought in the late 1990s but most farms had been in operation for a period 
before that, we assign all farms in operation before 1998 the same year registration date.12 We 
create a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a farm has a registration date before 1998, and 0 
otherwise.  
                                                          
11 That being said, European (and Irish) farms are typically run as family businesses as highlighted by Herzfeld & 
Jongeneel (2008). 
12 Similar to a driving licence. 
 
Previous violation(s) 
We create a set of dummy variables to indicate breaches of the Nitrates Regulations in previous 
years: a value of 1 in the first variable indicates that the farm violated the regulation last year and a 
1 in the second variable indicates that the farm had a violation two or more years ago. 
 
Previous derogation(s) 
We also create a dummy variable that records whether a farm had been granted a derogation in the 
previous year. Farms that move from having a derogation to not having one have to adapt their 
behaviour to comply with the lower NPH limit. We expect that this adjustment process may trigger 
breaches of the regulation for some farms.  
 
Data cleaning was undertaken and extreme values for some variables were omitted. In particular, we 
exclude farms with a land size smaller than 1 hectare. We choose this figure as farmers need to have 
at least one hectare of eligible land to qualify for the Basic Payment Scheme.13 Some summary 
statistics are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics  
      
      
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations 
NPH 72.9 70.4 0 8,393 1,264,629 
Age 53.3 13.9 16 105 1,119,697 
Land Size(Ha) 36.1 34.6 1 1,527 1,192,979 
 
4.  Methods 
We employ two types of binary logistic regression (logit) model: (1) random effects panel models 
estimated over data from multiple years; (2) single-year cross-sectional models estimated from data 
for a single a year. Panel models exploit the fact that we have repeated observations over time of 
the same farms, allowing us to control farm-level unobserved characteristics. However, such models 
require us to make some assumptions about the underlying distribution of the probability that farms 
are in violation and also about the stability of the relationships between covariates and the 
probability of violation. Hence we report both types of model. 
 
4.1 Random effects model 




�1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1��� =   𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚�𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛�𝒀𝒀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (1) 
 
Here the probability that an individual farm, i, violates the regulation in a certain year, j, is modelled 
as a function of a matrix of farm characteristics, Xij, and another matrix of farmer characteristics, Yij. 
The term αi captures variation in the underlying propensity of individual farms not to comply with 
the regulations, which we assume is normally distributed. The list of farm and farmer characteristics 
is as detailed previously in Section 3.2. Our regression analyses are run in Stata 14. 
                                                          
13 https://www.ifa.ie/bps/#.Woq9uK5l99N  
 
Regression results are reported in the form of odds ratios that compare the odds of a violation 
occurring in one group against those of a reference group. An odds ratio of greater than one 
indicates a greater likelihood of violation, while an odds ratio of less than one indicates a lower 
likelihood of violation. For example, if the reference category for the age variable were 51-60 years 
old and we reported an odds ratio of 2 for the 16-40 year old category, that would imply that the 
odds of a violation were twice as high among 16-40 year olds than among the reference category. 
Correspondingly, an odds ratio of 0.5 would imply that the odds of violation were half as high for this 
group as among those of the reference category. 
 
4.2 Cross-sectional models 
We also estimate cross-sectional logit models for each individual year in the dataset. However, the 
logit model for the year 2015 is used for prediction purposes, as this is the final full year of data we 
possess. We set the prediction threshold to balance the sensitivity (ability of the model to predict 
true positives) and specificity (ability to predict true negatives) of the model. This parameter may be 
adjusted depending upon the objectives of the analyst; for example, one might wish to ensure that 
all likely violators are included in the predicted group even at the cost of an increased number of 
false positives. The 2015 model coefficients have also been adapted for use in a ready-reckoner that 
generates a likelihood of violation for a farm with specific selected characteristics. This kind of model 
can help to inform trials to test interventions designed to reduce noncompliance, by targeting those 
farms that are most likely to violate for an intervention.  
 
4. 3 Robustness test 
 
To test whether our models have reasonable predictive performance given the set of variables 
included in them, we compare their results to those from the LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and 
Selection Operator) estimator (Tibsharani, 1996) which penalises the use of regressors that 
contribute little to the fit of the model. We use this model selection tool mainly as a robustness 
check to see whether restricting the extensive set of explanatory variables could improve its 
predictive performance. The Stata add-ins developed by Ahrens et al. (2018) are used for Lasso 
modelling. This check involves re-estimating the 2015 cross-sectional model using the cvlasso 
command and selecting the preferred set of regressors based on 10-fold cross-validation.  The 
optimal set of control variables and the resulting coefficients can then be compared to their OLS 
equivalents for the full model. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1 Regression output 
Table 3 presents regression results obtained from the estimation of the baseline model set out in 
Section 4. The two models of (1) Random Effects; and (2) Individual year logit for 2015 are given. The 
full set of cross sectional logit models for individual years is provided in the Annex. 
 
Table 3: Regression results for panel and cross-sectional regression models; odds ratios  
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) 
Violation Random effects 2015 cross-section 
 b/se b/se 
Lagged NPH (ref: 150-155)   
0-50 0.043*** (0.003) 0.069*** (0.010) 
50-100 0.055*** (0.004) 0.101*** (0.015) 
100-120 0.131*** (0.009) 0.212*** (0.033) 
120-140 0.302*** (0.019) 0.437*** (0.062) 
140-150 0.640*** (0.040) 0.600*** (0.093) 
155-160 1.305*** (0.087) 1.214 (0.193) 
160-165 1.964*** (0.122) 1.341* (0.207) 
165-170 2.555*** (0.157) 2.166*** (0.329) 
170-172 2.924*** (0.258) 2.264*** (0.509) 
172-180 2.353*** (0.390) 2.939*** (0.637) 
180-250 3.666*** (0.587) 3.288*** (0.658) 
250+ 6.749*** (1.166) 4.259*** (1.040) 
   
Land Size (ref: 30-40ha)   
1-5ha 6.883*** (0.423) 5.465*** (0.621) 
5-10ha 2.904*** (0.153) 2.585*** (0.275) 
10-15ha 1.824*** (0.098) 1.697*** (0.186) 
15-20ha 1.408*** (0.078) 1.447*** (0.163) 
20-25ha 1.297*** (0.073) 1.306** (0.154) 
25-30ha 1.132** (0.065) 1.223* (0.148) 
40-50ha 0.852*** (0.045) 0.951 (0.110) 
50-75ha 0.672*** (0.034) 0.787** (0.087) 
75-100ha 0.555*** (0.042) 0.776 (0.122) 
100+ha 0.412*** (0.042) 0.479*** (0.107) 
   
Violation last year 1.192 (0.185) 1.470** (0.249) 
Violation two or more years ago 1.993*** (0.063) 1.830*** (0.122) 
Derogation last year 0.948 (0.058) 0.178*** (0.031) 
   
Age (ref: 51-60)   
16-40 1.307*** (0.056) 0.965 (0.100) 
41-50 1.154*** (0.040) 1.094 (0.083) 
61-70 0.895*** (0.034) 0.893 (0.067) 
71+ 0.744*** (0.037) 0.782*** (0.071) 
   
Dummy=1 if farm registered before 
1998 
1.034 (0.031) 1.164** (0.076) 
   
Farm Structure (ref: Individual)   
Joint Venture 0.977 (0.164) 0.957 (0.373) 
Year Dummies Yes No 
County Dummies Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 671,030 110,422 
No. of Groups 116,444  




Across the two models, we see that both the lagged NPH and the size of the land holding have a 
consistent relationship with the likelihood of violating the regulations. Farms with greater NPH 
figures in the previous year are much more likely to violate the regulations. It is notable that there is 
no step-jump in the likelihood of noncompliance associated with previous NPH figures, but rather a 
steady and substantial increase; higher NPH in the previous year just steadily increases the 
probability of noncompliance in the current year. With respect to land size, smaller farms are 
substantially more likely to be in breach of the regulations. These results are robust to using 
different specifications.  
 
One explanation for the greater propensity of smaller farms to be in noncompliance is 
straightforward: it takes less change in livestock or fertiliser quantities to generate noncompliance.  
It is also possible that these farms deliberate more on whether the value of extra livestock or extra 
fertiliser is greater than the potential penalty cost of a breach. As the penalty for violating the 
regulations is a percentage reduction in a single farm payment, the value of which increases as land 
holdings increase, smaller farms face a smaller penalty value when making livestock and fertiliser use 
decisions.  
 
The age of the farmer is also an important predictor of violations. Younger farmers are more likely to 
be in noncompliance in the random effects model. This effect is significant in the majority of cross 
sectional models (see Annex) although this does not hold in all years, including 2015. The oldest 
category of farmers i.e. those who are over 71 years of age, are less likely to breach compared to 
those of average farmer age. This finding remains true across both models in Table 3 and the 
majority of individual year models.  
 
Previous violations are shown to be positive indicators of a violation when allowing for random 
effects. The random effects model includes farms regardless of violation history, so the odds ratios 
reflect the estimated odds of violation relative to a farm that has no previous violations. The 
coefficients confirm that repeat offenders make a substantial contribution to noncompliance. For 
farms that had a derogation in the previous year, a previous derogation reduces the probability of a 
violation in both models, although this is only statistically significant in the cross-sectional model. 
 
No statistically significant relationships are found for farm ownership structure or the registration 
time with the Department.  
 




(Figure 1) displays the odds ratios for each individual county dummy in the random effects model. 
The darker the shade of red, the higher the odds that a farmer from that county will be in violation 
of the regulations, after allowing for the farmer’s and farm’s characteristics. Cork is used as the 
reference county category as this is the county with the most farms. Table 8 in the Annex displays 
the full county level fixed-effects and indicates whether they are statistically significant. We 
immediately see that farms situated in the East and South East of the country are more likely to be in 
breach of the Nitrates Regulations. County Waterford has the highest rate. In contrast, farmers in 
the West are less likely to violate the regulations all other things equal, with farms in County Leitrim 
having the smallest likelihood.  
 
A possible reason for these differences is the relationship between stocking rates and land quality. 
Better land quality allows farmers to increase their stocking rate more easily and farms with greater 
livestock numbers per unit of land are more likely to breach the 170 NPH limit. Counties where 
farmers are more likely to violate the regulations such as Kildare and Waterford tend to have good 
land quality.14 The county effects map bears a striking resemblance to maps illustrating the length of 
grazing season in Ireland, for example in Collins & Cummins (1996, p.155) and found in the Annex 
(Figure 3). This figure shows that the south and east of the country can have a longer grazing season 
                                                          
14 Poaching, which is the damage to grassland from the feet of livestock, is a potential consequence from greater 
stocking rates, even on land of good quality. 
by up to 60 days/year than the north and west of the country. This relationship between the grazing 
season and stocking rates could potentially be driving the pattern of county effects.15 
 
A similar picture emerges when considering the odds ratios for each individual county dummy in the 
2015 cross-sectional model (see Figure 2 in the Annex). Again, the propensity to violate the 
regulations is much higher in counties in the South East of the country, although many of the 
individual county level fixed-effects in the 2015 model are short of statistical significance. 
 
5.2 Prediction tests 
We can compare the predictive power of our models to DAFM’s current rule-of-thumb of targeting 
those farms with an NPH figure of over 150 Kg NPH for additional compliance encouragement. By 
excluding the year 2015 from the data, we can assess predictive performance for 2015 based on 
data for 2014 and previous years. We compare both the performance of the panel models (data on 
all years 2006-2014) as well as the individual year model (2014 only) to the 150 KG NPH rule. We use 
a threshold probability cut-off of 0.0208 when predicting a case as a violation or not, which 
corresponds to the probability of violating the regulations across the period 2006-2015. Table 4 
compares the classification performance of the four models, reporting sensitivity and specificity. 
Sensitivity measures the proportion of actual positives that are correctly identified i.e. the 
probability of detecting a violation. Specificity measures the proportion of actual negatives that are 
correctly identified i.e. the true negative rate of farms in violation. 
 
DAFM’s rule-of-thumb is to target farms with an NPH figure over 150 Kg, which prompts just under 
11,000 letters to be sent out to warn about a potential farm breach and encourages ways for 
farmers to reach compliance. This rule achieves a detection rate of 56%. While our models 
outperform this in terms of correctly identifying those who do violate the regulations, they are less 
successful at correctly classifying those that do not violate the regulations. For the efficiency of the 
regulatory system, this is a trade-off between the ability to identify more of these likely violators and 
being able to mitigate the consequences of nitrates violations versus greater administrative costs in 
terms of correspondence to farms. We argue that false positives (i.e. farms that are flagged as 
violators but do not violate) are less important to DAFM than false negatives (i.e. farms that do not 
receive targeted correspondence but do violate). Our aim then is to improve on the Department’s 
sensitivity figure of 56% of violators correctly identified, without an excessive increase in the number 
of false positives and the subsequent administrative burden. 
 






Sensitivity 56 64 70 
Specificity  93 91 89 
Correctly 
Classified 92 91 88 
Number of 
Letters 10,786 10,758 13,928 
Note: Figures rounded to 1 percentage point. 
 
                                                          
15 Differing organic content in soils could also be a potential explanation of the map. 
https://www.agriculture.gov.ie/media/migration/ruralenvironment/environment/nitrates/2018/SoilsWithOrganic
MatteContentForestBareRkExcluded050118.png  
We alter the threshold probability cut-off to investigate the impact on the performance of the 
random effects model in terms of specificity and sensitivity. Tables 5 and 6 display the prediction 
performance of both models as the threshold changes. 
Table 5: Impact of the threshold level on prediction performance for the random effects panel model 
and the balance between sensitivity and specificity (%) 
Threshold 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.0075 0.001 
Violators 
detected 
50 59 73 77 97 
True negative 
rate 
95 93 87 83 34 
Correctly 
Classified 
95 93 87 84 35 
Number of 
Letters 
6,217 8,830 15,947 19,646 76,087 
Note: Figures rounded to 1 percentage point. 
Table 6: Impact of the threshold level on prediction performance for the cross-sectional model and 
the balance between sensitivity and specificity (%) 
Threshold 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.0075 0.001 
Violators 
detected 
58 65 77 82 100 
True negative 
rate 
93 91 83 78 10 
Correctly 
Classified 
93 90 83 78 12 
Number of 
Letters 
8,793 11,524 20,397 26,038 103,639 
Note: Figures rounded to 1 percentage point. 
These results illustrate the trade-off between sensitivity and specificity in prediction classification 
when setting a threshold probability cut-off. We observe that as the threshold probability is reduced, 
cases are more likely to be classified as violations. This improves the sensitivity of the model with the 
trade-off of reducing the specificity. Because the number of violations is small in relation to the 
sample, this has the impact of reducing the overall classification performance of the model. For 
example, a model that classifies all farms as not in violation will have a correctly classified 
percentage figure of over 90%, yet this is a poor model for identifying potential farm violators.  
With a very low threshold probability of violation cut-off of 0.001, we can identify almost all of the 
violators with a 100% true positive rate. This may be of great benefit to DAFM, knowing all likely 
violators will have been contacted and potentially trigger a behavioural response to comply. 
However, this comes at the great administrative cost of wrongly targeting around 85% of compliant 
farmers and so does not excel as a predictive model. Ultimately, the use of the predictive models 
depends on the costs of the interventions they are used to support.  They can be used to set a 
minimum proportion of violators detected or a maximum number of letters to send out to farms, 
depending on objectives and costs. To bring about this flexibility in terms of the statistical models, 
we have created a ready-reckoner that generates a probability of violation for a farm when a set of 
farm characteristics have been specified. DAFM can adjust the threshold probability level at which a 
farm is predicted to be in violation to suit their needs. This tool can prove to be very effective, 
particularly when assessing on a farm by farm basis. 
5.3 Robustness test 
As discussed earlier, we use the LASSO estimator to check if a selecting a more parsimonious set of 
control variables might help improve the predictive performance of the 2015 cross-sectional model. 
We then compared the set of regressors and the resulting coefficients to their OLS equivalents.  The 
LASSO results suggest that the vast majority of coefficients do contribute to the predictive 
performance of the model.  Three county effects (Galway, Kilkenny and Sligo) are omitted in the 
preferred specification, implying that they are not greatly different from Cork. However, omitting 
these variables has little effect on the other coefficients or on the fit of the model. 
 
 
6.  Discussion and future research 
In the context of ongoing regulatory difficulties in reducing the level of noncompliance with the 
Nitrates Regulations, this study employed administrative data on Irish farms to investigate and 
identify associations between noncompliance and the characteristics of individual farms and 
farmers. A combination of statistical models was used to determine which farms are most likely to 
be in noncompliance. The models yielded clear results. Farms with smaller land holdings and those 
with previous violations are significantly and substantially more likely to violate the regulations. In 
addition, there is a systematic relationship between compliance and the age of the farmer, with 
older farmers are more likely to comply with the regulatory limit, as well as a pattern of varying 
compliance by county. The models can also be employed to estimate predicted probabilities of 
noncompliance, with a view to identifying a subset of farms for targeting interventions. In this 
regard, the findings show that the models outperform a simple rule-of-thumb based on a threshold 
level of NPH.  
 
These results have the potential to be used to assist farmers in avoiding a loss of income through 
penalties for exceeding regulatory limits. The use of equivalent statistical models based on the most 
up-to-date data offers the possibility of targeting farmers most at risk of noncompliance with 
informational or behavioural interventions. A further benefit of the comprehensive administrative 
data is that such interventions can be tested for effectiveness through randomised controlled trials, 
which can be conducted on the complete population of farms and with comprehensive data. A 
combination of modelling and trials makes it possible to underpin regulatory efforts with more 
analytical rigour in order to reduce violations of the Nitrates Regulations, with the ultimate goal of 
decreased nutrient pollution in watercourses. Generally, better land management of farms, 
including more viable long-term stocking rates, can generate positive externalities for local 
ecosystems.  
 
While the statistical models are useful for understanding associations and targeting interventions, 
they offer limited insights into the root causes of noncompliance. The current exercise had no access 
to information on comprehension of the regulations, inattention to the regulations, attitudes 
towards the regulations and/or regulators, the administrative burden of the regulation, or the 
technical abilities of farmers, any of which could in principle affect compliance. Recall, however, that 
the majority of farms that exceeded the 170 Kg NPH limit were not in breach the previous year. The 
implication is, naturally, that something on the farm must have changed. In this context, it is notable 
that the present findings show that the probability of noncompliance increases substantially and 
steadily with the previous year’s NPH figure. This implies that many violations do not occur because 
of minor changes in on-farm practice, but appear to reflect failure to observe the regulatory limit 
when increasing stocking rates or when changing the size of the land holding, in some cases 
appreciably.  
 
Buckley et al. (2015) found older farmers to be more resistant to the adoption of improved nutrient 
management practices. Yet our models show that older farmers are more likely to comply with the 
regulations. At first sight, given that the regulations are in part designed to improve nutrient 
management, this might seem contradictory. However, the simple explanation may be that older 
farmers are less likely to seek to change the business. It is when change occurs, for instance when 
expanding the business, altering production, or perhaps selling land, that noncompliance becomes 
more likely. Note that the smaller the farm, the higher the chance that any given change takes the 
farm beyond the regulatory NPH limit. 
 
One important limitation of the current study is that it could not address directly the incentive 
effects of punishment. An important issue may be the lag between noncompliance and punishment. 
The loss of income is not felt until the year after the breach and then only as a foregone gain (i.e., a 
reduction in a payment). Herzfeld & Jongeneel (2008) detail potential reasons for agricultural 
noncompliance drawing on psychological and sociological literature, including Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which implies that farmers would be more likely to alter their 
behaviour if penalties were experienced as losses rather than foregone gains. 
 
This paper also offers one demonstration of how government departments can make greater use of 
the combination of administrative data and modern statistical techniques. The notion of “big data” 
refers to possibilities for collation and analysis conferred by digitisation and the power of modern 
computers. It is only in recent years that datasets the size of the one analysed in this paper can be 
manipulated and subjected to proper statistical modelling. In this way, relatively small effects 
located in datasets that cover large populations have the potential to translate into significant 
efficiency savings. Here, we have made a start in applying such techniques to nitrate pollution on 
Irish farms. There is the possibility of adding further to the data thus far compiled, to include socio-
economic characteristics of farmers (such as educational attainment), whether farmers have a 
second job, whether they have access to a farm adviser, the spatial characteristics of farms, and so 
on. All of these factors may have an impact on the likelihood of compliance with the Nitrates 
Regulations. The building of such large datasets for policy and regulatory analysis has much 
potential, within the domain of agriculture and elsewhere.  
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Table 7: Regression results from cross-sectional models with data from individual years; odds ratios 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Lagged NPH (ref: 150-
155) 
0-50 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
50-100 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
100-120 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 
120-140 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 
140-150 0.64** 0.77 0.80 0.65*** 0.60*** 0.67*** 
155-160 1.22 1.38 1.72** 1.49** 1.13 1.21 
160-165 2.41*** 1.77*** 2.89*** 1.81*** 1.69*** 2.08*** 
165-170 3.01*** 2.09*** 3.93*** 2.29*** 2.17*** 2.70*** 
170-172 2.47*** 3.76*** 5.76*** 2.36*** 2.85*** 2.73*** 
172-180 3.38* 2.73e+06*** 6.39** 0.65 1.32 3.94 
180-250 5.72*** 5.31e+06*** 13.17*** 0.90 2.00** 6.78* 
250+ 10.83*** 1.03e+07*** 24.31*** 1.84 3.07*** 11.34** 
Land Size (ref: 30-40ha) 
1-5ha 6.22*** 4.32*** 3.87*** 4.06*** 6.26*** 4.35*** 
5-10ha 3.17*** 2.54*** 2.03*** 2.18*** 3.19*** 1.95*** 
10-15ha 1.83*** 1.39** 1.43** 1.79*** 2.42*** 1.28** 
15-20ha 1.30* 1.32* 1.34** 1.24* 1.68*** 1.09 
20-25ha 1.13 1.11 1.13 0.98 1.68*** 1.20 
25-30ha 0.96 1.22 1.25 0.96 1.15 0.96 
40-50ha 0.93 1.00 0.92 0.72*** 0.85 0.73*** 
50-75ha 0.64*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.53*** 0.77** 0.73*** 
75-100ha 0.69* 0.79 0.58*** 0.31*** 0.66*** 0.46*** 
100+ha 0.47*** 0.49** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.47*** 
VIP_lagviolation1 1.76 0.00*** 1.13 6.50* 2.34*** 0.74 
VIP_lagviolation2 1.78*** 2.23*** 2.04*** 1.90*** 2.07*** 2.06*** 
lagderog1 1.34* 0.99 2.84*** 0.13*** 1.10 0.78* 
Age (ref: 51-60) 
16-40 1.30** 1.00 1.35** 1.29** 1.37*** 1.48*** 
41-50 1.08 1.01 1.22** 1.37*** 1.14* 1.10 
61-70 0.94 0.80** 1.02 1.10 0.88 0.83** 
71+ 0.83 0.70** 0.97 0.91 0.75** 0.63*** 
Dummy=1 if farm has 
1980 registration date 
1.04 0.98 1.08 0.90 0.92 1.07 
Farm Structure (ref: 
Individual) 
Joint Venture 0.75 0.79 0.96 0.70 0.90 1.54 
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 88,613 89,530 88,798 92,126 98,718 102,823 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 8: County-level fixed effects on odds of nitrates violation (Cork is used as the reference county) 
Dependent Variable: (1) (3) 
Violation Random effects 2015 cross-section 
 b/se b/se 
Carlow 1.159 1.014 
 (0.132) (0.240) 
Cavan 0.917 1.251* 
 (0.063) (0.164) 
Clare 0.471*** 0.597** 
 (0.048) (0.120) 
Donegal 0.787*** 0.804 
 (0.059) (0.138) 
Dublin 0.819 0.938 
 (0.197) (0.439) 
Galway 0.793*** 0.877 
 (0.049) (0.116) 
Kerry 0.969 0.823 
 (0.060) (0.117) 
Kildare 1.438*** 1.368 
 (0.134) (0.297) 
Kilkenny 1.026 1.249 
 (0.076) (0.187) 
Laois 1.140* 1.220 
 (0.087) (0.194) 
Leitrim 0.437*** 0.604 
 (0.074) (0.204) 
Limerick 1.033 1.276* 
 (0.064) (0.164) 
Longford 0.755*** 1.154 
 (0.081) (0.252) 
Louth 1.016 1.196 
 (0.111) (0.276) 
Mayo 0.542*** 0.606*** 
 (0.044) (0.102) 
Meath 1.155** 1.314* 
 (0.080) (0.185) 
Monaghan 0.919 0.895 
 (0.057) (0.121) 
Offaly 1.299*** 1.695*** 
 (0.095) (0.247) 
Roscommon 0.680*** 1.002 
 (0.064) (0.179) 
Sligo 0.529*** 0.853 
 (0.068) (0.189) 
Tipperary 1.389*** 1.179 
 (0.073) (0.137) 
Waterford 1.531*** 1.233 
 (0.114) (0.200) 
Westmeath 0.879 1.187 
 (0.079) (0.227) 
Wexford 1.324*** 1.503*** 
 (0.093) (0.217) 
Wicklow 1.232* 1.239 
 (0.132) (0.278) 
 
Figure 2: Violation county map of Ireland (2015 data only) 
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